Louisiana Law Review
Volume 26 | Number 3
The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the
1965-1966 Term: A Faculty Symposium
Symposium: Administration of Criminal Justice
April 1966

Private Law: Obligations
J. Denson Smith

Repository Citation
J. Denson Smith, Private Law: Obligations, 26 La. L. Rev. (1966)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol26/iss3/8

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

494

[Vol. XXVI

OBLIGATIONS
J. Denson Smith*
GENERAL

The case of Cox v. Aldrich & Co.' involved an interesting
problem concerning the existence of a stipulation pour autrui,
its acceptance by the beneficiary, and the possibility of its revocation. On the original opinion the court held that the facts did
not disclose such a stipulation. On rehearing, the court, assuming the existence of the stipulation, held that it had not been
accepted by the beneficiary. In a concurring opinion, Judge
Sanders took the position that the power of revocation had been
reserved by the promisee by the terms of the contract and had
been validly exercised. In a dissenting opinion, Judge Summers
found that a stipulation pour autrui had been made, that it had
been duly accepted by the plaintiff, and that it was not subject
to revocation by the promisee. Delicate problems of interpretation were involved concerning which differences of opinion
could reasonably be held. Without attempting a nice analysis of
the facts, it is the opinion of this writer that a stipulation for
the benefit of the plaintiff was contained in the contract between
the highway department as promisee and the defendant contractor as promisor. This belief finds support in the fact that
the department had promised plaintiff to render the performance in question, which involved structural changes in her filling
station, in return for the grant of a right of way, thus making
the department her debtor. In turn, the department contracted
with the defendant for the fulfillment or discharge of its obligation to plaintiff. Inasmuch as it appears that the performance
by defendant was to be given and received in discharge of the
department's obligation to plaintiff, ample justification would
exist for recognizing a right of action in plaintiff, thereby avoiding circuity of action. No more explicit intention to benefit the
plaintiff should be necessary. This view is further supported by
the fact that defendant recognized an obligation on its part to
plaintiff to do the work and would have done it except for the
fact that a dispute developed when its agents approached plaintiff to carry out the obligation. The writer is in favor of the
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 247 La. 797, 174 So. 2d 634 (1964).
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liberal approach of Justice Summers in dealing with the question of consent by the beneficiary to avail himself of the stipulation. Although the instant beneficiary's demands may have gone
beyond the obligation assumed by the defendant, it does not seem
justifiable to say that she had rejected the benefit. She was
merely disputing its extent. In contending that the right of the
beneficiary can rise no higher than its source and that a power
of revocation reserved by the promisee should be given effect,
the concurring opinion was on solid ground from the standpoint
of legal principle. The reservation of a right to change the
beneficiary in a life insurance policy is a generally recognized
example of this rule. Whether the contract language in question
amounted to such a reservation is another question. The fact
that the beneficiary's consent to enter upon her property had
been secured in return for the undertaking to perform upon it
the work in question raises a substantial doubt that a power of
revocation had been reserved as to her situation.
A case bearing some resemblance to the foregoing is Ordoneaux v. Koller Constr. Co. 2 The court found the plaintiff to
be the beneficiary of a stipulation pour autrui stemming from
a promise by a road contractor to remove a quantity of rocks
placed during the course of highway construction upon property
acquired by plaintiff. The opinion indicates that defendant had
made a direct promise to plaintiff to remove the rocks. If so,
the case might have been disposed of on this basis. The facts
suggest also that the cause of defendant's promise might have
been treated as illicit, inasmuch as it was given by him to induce
the engineers to cease a possibly wrongful withholding of their
approval of work done by the contractor, but this possibility,
presumably, was not considered.
In 1962, R.S. 23:921 was amended so as to provide that
where an employer incurs expense in training an employee or
in advertising the business in which the employer is engaged,
the employee may bind himself not to enter into the same business as that of the employer or over the same route or in the
same territory for a period of two years. In Aetna Fin. Co. v.
Adams 3 the plaintiff employer was seeking to enforce, by way
of an injunction and a claim for stipulated damages, such a
contract against an employee who had served as manager of
2. 166 So. 2d 1 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964).
3. 170 So. 2d 740 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1964).
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the Baton Rouge office of plaintiff. The court found that immediately after his resignation as manager, the defendant had
formed a finance company of his own, the office of which was
eight blocks distant from that of plaintiff, and that many of his
customers had previously borrowed from plaintiff. It also found
that during his employment by plaintiff, defendant was undergoing training at all times, even as manager, that he was supervised directly by an officer of the company and furnished with
various instructional manuals, and that the company had expended substantial sums in advertising the business. Since the
contract period of more than a year had expired at the time
of the hearing, the court found that the question of issuance of
an injunction had become moot, but awarded plaintiff the stipulated damages. It treated as unimportant the fact that defendant was already employed at the time the contract in question
was signed, and rejected defendant's claim that the contract
was opposed to public policy, saying that the legislature had
spoken in clear and unambiguous language. The Supreme Court
4
rejected the application for a writ of review.
Subsequently, a similar problem was presented
to the Third
Circuit Court of Appeal in the case of National Motor Club of
La. v. Conque.5 The employer sued to enforce the employee's
agreement not to compete. It covered a period of five years.
The district court granted a permanent injunction prohibiting
competition for a period of two years, the allowable period under
R.S. 23:921. The court of appeal reversed. It found that sums
spent by the employer in advertising his business, as distinguished from advertising the employee's connection with it, did
not constitute "expense in advertisement" within the meaning
of the statutory provision, and that the employer had not afforded special training of a substantial nature to the employee.
Its conclusion was, in consequence, that the agreement was contrary to public policy. In the course of its opinion the court
acknowledged that its decision was "to some extent conflicting"
with the Aetna case,6 the reasoning of which it did not approve.
Judge Hood dissented in an opinion concurred in by Judge
Savoy. An application for a writ of certiorari was denied by
the Supreme Court on the ground that, "According to the facts
of this case the result reached by the Court of Appeal is cor4. 247 La. 489, 172 So. 2d 294 (1965).
5. 173 So. 2d 238 (LA. App. 3d Cir. 1965).
6. 170 So. 2d 740 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1964).
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rect." It is to be regretted that, in view of the fundamentally
diverse holdings in the Aetna Fin. Co.7 and National Motor
Club" cases, the Supreme Court did not take the opportunity to
save the law in this area from a lack of clarity which has proved
to be troublesome." Although the 1962 amendment to R.S. 23:921
is not as specific as might have been desirable in dealing with
"those cases where the employer incurs an expense in the training of the employee or incurs an expense in the advertisement of
the business that the employer is engaged in," it does reflect a
legislative determination which appears to be in conflict with
the view of the majority of the court in the National Motor
Club case. 10 The Supreme Court might have concluded that since
the agreement of the employee covered a period of five years,
it would have to be counted as wholly unauthorized and consequently not valid for even the permitted period of two years,
but this explanation is not necessarily supportable by the language of the denial of the application for the writ. The court
of appeal specifically declined to pass upon this point.
It is established that a voluntary remission may be made of a
part as well as the whole of an indebtedness. 1 The existence of
a dispute concerning the indebtedness or the amount thereof is
not necessary to its effectiveness. In PontchartrainPark Homes
v. Sewerage & Water Board,12 plaintiff had secured a judgment
including interest and costs against the defendant in a third party proceeding and the Supreme Court had affirmed it.3 Thereafter defendant paid plaintiff only the principal amount of the
judgment, claiming that it was not liable for the interest and
costs. Presumably, plaintiff did not undertake expressly to reserve its right to claim the latter, although it seemingly insisted
upon full payment. By way of defense to the present suit to
establish plaintiff's right to the interest and costs, defendant
claimed an "accord and satisfaction" of the judgment. In disposing of this defense, the court said that plaintiff's claim after
final judgment was no longer an unliquidated one and could not
serve, therefore, as the basis for an accord and satisfaction.
7. I bid.
8. 173 So. 2d 238 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965).
9. See Blanchard v. Haher, 166 La. 1014, 118 So. 117 (1928).
10. 173 So. 2d 238 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965).
11. Johnson v. Boice, 40 La. Ann. 273, 4 So. 163 (1888).

12. 246. La. 893, 168 So.2d 595 (1964).
13. Keller Const. Corp. v. George IV. McCoy & Co., 239 La. 522, 119 So. 2d
450 (1960).
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Both the claim of accord and satisfaction and the reason for its
rejection are suggestive of the common law doctrine of consideration rather than the civilian theory of cause. Under the common law theory, the significance of a dispute lies in the fact that
in its absence the receipt by a creditor of less than the whole
amount due will not serve as consideration to support an agreement by him to discharge the remainder. In our civilian system,
however, although a disputed claim may be compromised by way
of settlement, an undisputed claim may be discharged, in whole
or in part, by voluntary remission. No consideration is required
and the absence of a dispute is wholly unimportant. To sustain
the latter defense it would be necessary to find that plaintiff intended to remit his claim to interests and costs or that he had
estopped himself to claim the contrary. The facts, however,
would not have supported either finding. 14 In consequence, the
result seems to be clearly correct under a theory either of compromise or remission. 15
In the case of Levy v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 6 the
court, upon finding no proof of actual damages resulting from
defendant's failure to list the business phone of plaintiff attorney in its directory, awarded nominal damages in the amount of
$500. Plaintiff had prayed for an award of $50,000, which included $15,000 for embarrassment, humiliation, and mental
anguish. It is doubtful that article 1934(3) of the Civil Code
affords any authority for the latter claim. This provision seems
to authorize a departure from direct pecuniary loss as the measure of recovery in actions for breach of contract only where "the
contract has for its object the gratification of some intellectual
enjoyment, whether in religion, morality or taste or some convenience or other legal gratification." Although the meaning of
these words is not free from doubt, the design of the provision
seems to be to reach contracts other than those of a commercial nature where pecuniary loss is the measure.
In a similar case, 7 another, but overlapping, panel of the
same court said that the provision contained in article 1934(3)
14. See 1 POTHIER, OBLIGATIONS, Part I, c. I, § 6 (1861).
1.5. Clear and convincing intent to remit is required. LA. CIVIL CODE art.

2232 (1870); Commercial & Savings Bank v. Quality Shop, 141 So. 498 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1932) ; C. 0. Black Improvement Co. v. Swink, 197 So. 693 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1940).
16. 172 So. 2d 371 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965).
.7. Loridans v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 172 So. 2d 323 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1965).
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"affords broad latitude to the trial judge in determining the
amount of the award." Perhaps, however, the court's discretion
or latitude should be limited to the kind of contract described
in the provision, not one merely of a commercial nature. An
obligation to list a person's name for business purposes in a
telephone directory is an obligation having a commercial purpose. Mental anguish and humiliation may be but are usually
not within the contemplation of the parties to contracts of this
nature, and the test of foreseeability is applicable to such damages not only by French civilian law but by the common law as
well. 18 Indeed, article 1150 of the Code Napoleon, which requires
that damages recoverable for a good faith breach be within the
contemplation of the parties, was used in argument in the leading English case and has been credited with influencing the English court to adopt the same principle. 9 Where damages are
properly limited to pecuniary loss, an award of damages in a
purely nominal amount may be justified if it clearly appears that
some damage may have occurred but there is no showing of the
extent of the loss. But damages for mental pain and suffering
are not to be confused with nominal damages to compensate for
a pecuniary loss.
The case of Jones v. Whittington0 applied the measure of recovery approved in Fite v. Miller" for breach of an obligation to
22
drill an oil well, i.e., the cost of drilling. Certiorari was denied.
In holding that defendant was not guilty of exacting usurious
interest by taking a note for $3,744 to cover a loan of $2,000, the
court in Clasen v. Excel Fin. Causeway, Inc.' 3 took occasion to
remark on the unsatisfactory state of the law and to suggest
the need for statutory correction. The writer shares this view.
A similar case was Soab v. Murphy,'2 4 where interest in the
amount of $1,000 was capitalized in a note covering an advance
of $1,140.
18. See Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch. 341 (1854) ; RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS,
§ 341 (1950). For a leading case holding damages for mental suffering within
the contemplation of the parties to a contract to deliver a message concerning
death, see Graham v. Western Union Tel. Co., 109 La. 1069, 34 So. 91 (1903).
19. 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS 1076, nn. 1-5, §§ 1007, 1076 (1950).
20. 171 So. 2d 764 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1965).
21. 196 l.a. 876, 200 So. 285 (1940).
22. 247 La. 624, 172 So. 2d 703 (1965).
23. 170 So. 2d 924 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965), applying LA. CIVIL CODE art.
2924 (1870).
24. 174 So. 2d 157 (l.a. App. 4th Cir. 1965).
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In Pittman Constr. Co. v. Housing Authority of New Orleans,25 the court concluded that the 1960 revision of section 35
of article III of the Constitution rendered defendant agency
liable for interest on all amounts awarded from the time they
became due until paid.
It was held in Granger v. General Motors Corp.2 that the
satisfaction of a judgment obtained against an automobile liability insurer of a car which struck plaintiff's car from the rear
precluded suit against the dealer who sold the offending car, alleged to have had faulty brakes, and its manufacturer, based on
a theory of warranty. The basis of the decision was that an imperfect solidarity existed between the tortfeasor, the dealer, and
the manufacturer by virtue of the fact that, assuming liability,
each would be responsible for the whole of the damage, and that,
in consequence, payment by the tortfeasor operated to exonerate the dealer and the manufacturer. The court observed that the
remedy of plaintiff for an inadequate award in his suit against
the liability insurer was by way of appeal, which remedy had
not been sought. In passing, it should be noted that there is
some doubt as to whether a third party damaged in consequence
of a defect in an automobile would have a cause of action in warranty against the manufacturer and the dealer. 7
28
The case of Smith v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co.
raised the question of whether a husband's immunity to suit by
his wife for personal injuries occasioned by his negligence jointly with that of a third party was a bar to a claim by the third
party by way of contribution for damages recovered by the wife.
The Supreme Court, reversing the court of appeal, held that it
was not. Its position was that the wife had a substantive cause
of action against the husband, although not permitted to sue him.
It declined to broaden R.S. 9:291 so as to permit the husband to
invoke against a third party his claim of immunity. Justice
Sanders dissented. His position was that the court's decision
was contrary to earlier lower court decisions which denied contribution against a parent with respect to damages recovered by
his child. He also considered it contrary to the principle that a
25. 169 So. 2d 122 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964).
26. 171 So. 2d 720 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965).
27. See LeBlanc v. La. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 221 La. 919, 60 So. 2d 873
(1952), and Gordon v. Bates-Crumley Chevrolet Co., 182 La. 795, 162 So. 624
(1935); Comment, 22 LA. L. REV. 435 (1962) ; Mazeaud, La Responsabilitd
Civile du Veideur-Fabricant, REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE, no. 4, at 611 (Oct.-Dec.
1955).
28. 247 Ia. 695, 174 So. 2d 122 (1965).
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wrongdoer cannot have a greater right than the victim has
against a co-tortfeasor and thus profit by his own wrong. He
pointed out that the court's decision had the effect of imposing
on an uninsured husband a loss amounting to one-half of the
amount recovered by his wife, thus placing him in an undesirable
adversary position. One might wish that the majority opinion
had dealt with the cases cited by the dissenting judge. Jurisprudence to the effect that the victim of tortious conduct may sue
the insurer of the wrongdoer although the latter would be immune to suit do not seem clearly analogous. Such a rule benefits
the victim and denies to the insurer an immunity meant for
another. The rule applied by the court operates to the ultimate
disadvantage of the victim and to that of the beneficiary of the
immunity. Perhaps the answer to the instant decision may lie
in doubling the amount of the wife's recovery, which would be
undesirable, or in legislation.
The problem of contribution was also involved in Stewart v.
Roosevelt Hotel.2 9 It was held that a release of the active tortfeasor under a reservation did not deprive the defendant hotel,
which was constructively liable, of its right to claim contribution from him.
In Richardson v. Cole,30 plaintiff was seeking partial recovery of a considerable sum paid for dancing lessons. The claim
was based on the ground that plaintiff had become physically
incapable of continuing the lessons. The court held for the plaintiff, relying on article 2001 of the Civil Code and holding that
the obligation was personal to the obligee. Article 2003, which
permits recovery by the heirs where such an obligee dies, seems
to provide clear analogical support for the decision.
The case of Jenkins v. Le 1 affirmed a ruling made earlier
by the Supreme Court ' 2 that under Civil Code article 2245 a
signature in the form of an "X," if disavowed, cannot be proved
merely by the testimony of one witness.
In Montelepre Memorial Hospital v. Kambur,33 the court
properly held that an oral promise by defendants to pay
for hospital services which they were undertaking to engage
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

170 So. 2d 681 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965).
173 So. 2d 336 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1965).
166 So. 2d 645 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1964).
Watts v. Collier, 140 La. 99, 72 So. 2d 822 (1916).
170 So. 2d 214 (La. App. 4tb Cir. 1964).
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for a third party gave rise to a direct primary obligation which
did not have to be in writing to be enforceable.
A problem of unjust enrichment was presented in Martin v.
Bozeman.3 4 An aunt, deceased, of plaintiff's wife lived at the
matrimonial domicile from the time of the marriage until the
death of the wife, a period of over ten years. During this time
she was treated as a member of the household. After the death
of the wife the aunt continued to live in plaintiff's home for an
additional number of years, during which time she stated on
seyeral occasions that she would take care of plaintiff in her
will. Plaintiff filed a claim against her succession. The court
found that he was entitled to recover on the basis of a contract
implied in fact during the period following the wife's death, but
rejected his claim based on unjust enrichment covering the former period. The rejection was placed on the ground that during
this period a gratuity was intended. Such a finding amounts
to the holding that the enrichment resulting from the gratuity
was not unjustified.
The case of Wilson v. Grunwald85 is being noted in this Review. It held that a payment by a fire insurer to a mortgagee
under a mortgage clause, followed by the delivery of the mortgage note to the insurer, at its request, endorsed "to any future
holder" constituted a purchase of the note. It is true that the
payment of a note by a stranger will be held a purchase in the
absence of a showing of intention to discharge the note by payment,86 but the question remains as to whether the insurer in the
instant case should have been counted as a stranger.
The case of Willis v. Allied Insulation Co.37 is also being noted
in this Review. It involved the question of whether a stated
guarantee of a monthly income "if qualified" contained in a
"Help Wanted" advertisement became part of a contract of
employment to which the advertisement led.
SALES

In the case of Womack v. Sternberg,38 certiorari was granted
for the limited purpose of considering the award of damages
34. 173 So. 2d 382 (La. App, 1st Cir. 1965).
35. 169 So. 2d 617 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1964).
36. Cason v. Cecil, 194 La. 41, 193 So. 362 (1940)
v. Blythe, 227 La. 889, 80 So. 2d 853 (1955)..
37. 174 So. 2d 858 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1965).
88. 247 La. 566, 172 So. 2d 683 (1965).

and also Dixie Land Co.
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stemming from nonperformance by one of the parties to a contract of exchange. It was held that the plaintiff was entitled
to damages based on the difference in value, if any, of the property to be transferred by him and the property to be received by
him in return, measured as of the time of the breach. In a welldocumented dissenting opinion, Justice Hawthorne expressed the
view that it was erroneous to determine the value of the respective performances as of the time of the breach, that such values
should be determined as of the time of the trial in the lower
court. A thorough examination of these opposing positions would
require more space than is allotted for this review. Suffice it
to say that this writer favors the view of the majority. It
appears to be in accord with article 2152 of the Civil Code,8 9 and
also with the common law, which, if we take the word of Judge
Preston for it,4 ° our draftsmen intended to adopt in lieu of the
rule reflected in article 1633 of the French Civil Code.
It is well established by our cases that an out-of-state conditional vendor is entitled to assert ownership of the thing conditionally sold if it is removed to Louisiana without his knowl41
certain drilling equipment
edge or consent. In Cooper v. Farr,
to Louisiana withwas
removed
conditionally sold in Arkansas
out the knowledge or consent of the conditional vendor and was
here employed in the drilling of an oil well. When this was discovered, the vendor recorded the conditional sales contract in
the mortgage records of the parish where the equipment was
then located. Thereafter he claimed priority over the statutory
privileges of laborers and materialmen. It was held that, by
virtue of the wording of the statute granting the claimed privileges, the conditional vendor's claim of ownership could not be
asserted to their prejudice. The opinion also rejected the vendor's claim that, by suing in Louisiana for the price of the equipment, he acquired a vendor's lien under Louisiana law.
The courts have been commendably liberal in rescinding the
sale of automobiles for redhibitory vices where substantial defects have been present. If past cases have encouraged buyers
39. "'In the case provided for in the last preceding article, and in all other
cases where the value of the thing to be delivered, enters into the measure of
damages, its price, or that sum for which others of the like quality could have

been purchased at the time agreed on for the delivery, is to 'be the rule for
calculating the value; or, if no time was stipulated, then the price, at the time
of the demand, must be referred to."

40. See Burrows v. Peirce, 6 La. Ann. 297 (1851).
41. 165 So. 2d 605 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1964).
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to expect too much, the decision in Leson Chevrolet Co. v. Barbier42 may serve as an appropriate warning. Its rejection of a
claim for redhibition was entirely justified by the showing that
the vendee had continued to use the car two years after discovering that the engine block was cracked.
The First Circuit Court of Appeal seems to have been on
solid ground in rejecting a claim of $500,.00 for worry and annoyance based on Civil Code article 1934(3) in connection with
its judgment rescinding the sale of an automobile for redhibitory
vices. 43 Although paragraph 3 of article 1934 has been applied
very broadly, sometimes perhaps with dubious propriety, the
present contract could hardly be counted as one involving some
intellectual enjoyment or legal gratification.
In a well-reasoned opinion, the Supreme Court in Stack v.
Irwin44 granted rescission, on the ground of error relating to the
principal cause, of a contract to purchase a house and lot. When
the purchaser discovered a break in the concrete slab supporting
the structure which, unknown to him, existed at the time of contracting, he refused to consummate the sale. In concurring,
Justice Hamiter relied on Bornemann v. Richards.45 The damage
in the Bornemann case occurred, however, after a conditional
contract to sell had been entered into and before the agreement
had been consummated by an act of sale, a situation which seems
46
to be expressly dealt with in the Civil Code.
Some years ago the Supreme Court adopted the view that
one who sustains injury through the consumption of deleterious
foreign matter in a bottled beverage is entitled to rely on an
implied warranty of wholesomeness by the manufacturer.4 7 In
consequence, unless the manufacturer can show positively that
the foreign matter got into the beverage after it left his hands,
his responsibility is established. In Love v. New Amsterdam
Cas. Co., 48 the plaintiff, although suing the manufacturer of
49
ice cream on the basis of negligence, relied on the LeBlanc
case as authority for the proposition that she had to show only
42. 173 So. 2d 50 (La.

43.
44.
45.
46.

App. 4th Cir. 1965).

Aiken v. Moran Motor Co., 165 So. 2d 662 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1964).
246 La. 777, 167 So. 2d 363 (1964).
245 La. 851, 161 So. 2d 741 (1964).
LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 2044, 2471 (1870).

47. LeBlanc v. Louisiana

Coca-Cola

Bottling Co.,

873 (1952).
48. 175 So. 2d 398 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965).

49. 221 La. 919, 60 So, 2d 873 (1952).

221

La.

919, 60 So. 2d
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that the ice cream she consumed in a cone and which had been
taken from a half-empty container in a freezing chest contained
some foreign substance which resulted in injury to her and
that the burden would then shift to the manufacturer to show
freedom from negligence. The court rejected this theory. It
took the view that the LeBlan 5 0 case could not be so extended.
It also found that, since the ice cream had been taken from a
half-empty container, the case was not one calling for an application against the manufacturer of the principle res ipsa loquitur.
The Louisiana Civil Code clearly indicates that a purported
sale lacking a price may stand, on proper proof, as another kind
of contract.5 1 This principle, which seems sometimes to be overlooked, was correctly applied by the First Circuit Court of Ap52
peal in Giuffria Realty Co. v. Kathman-Landry, Inc. It refused
to hold as an absolute nullity a transfer for a recited price followed by a correction deed recognizing that no price had been
paid. The decision of the same court, although a different panel,
a difin the case of Bolding v. Eason Oil Co.,5 3 which reflects 54
ferent approach, has been reversed by the Supreme Court.
In State, Dep't of Highways v. Tucker,55 the Supreme Court
affirmed a view recognized in earlier lower appellate decisions
that, where a sale per aversionem designates a railroad right
of way as a boundary, the transfer does not convey any interest
in the property underlying the railroad servitude.
The principle that title to real estate cannot be proved by
50
parol was urged upon the court in Elmore v. Butler, where
a notary public signed an authentic act of sale for the vendor.
The evidence showed that the vendor was shaking so much he
could not affix his signature to the document, whereupon he
authorized the notary to do it for him. The case has been noted
with approval in this Review.57 The particular point was res
nova.
50. Ibid.

arts. 1894, 1900, 2464 (1870).
173 So. 2d 329 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965).
170 So.2d 883 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965).
248 La. 269, 178 So. 2d 246 (1965).
247 La. 188, 170 So. 2d 371 (1964).
169 So. 2d 717 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1964).
Note, 25 LA. L. REV. 977 (1965).

51. LA. CIVIL CODE

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
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In S & W Investment Co. v. Otis W. Sharp & Son,"8 the Supreme Court held that the risk of loss of the shell of an incompleted swimming pool remained on the undertaker despite a
progress payment of $3,000, due by the terms of the contract
upon the completion of the shell. It found article 2761 of the
Civil Code not applicable inasmuch as defendant's obligation
was "not divisible, i.e., it was not for work composed of 'detached
pieces.'" Under the Code, divisibility of an obligation is applicable only to the heirs of the creditor and debtor.5 9 As between the parties the obligation must be "executed as if it were
indivisible." The sense in which the court used the term "divisible" is better known to the common law than to the civil. Even
so, its use in the former system has been exposed as being more
confusing than illuminating. 6 The terms "divisibility" and "indivisibility" may have different meanings and different applications depending upon the precise issue to be resolved. A contract may well be counted as divisible in one respect and indivisible in another. 61 It is helpful, therefore, that the court explained its position by pointing out that the various portions of
the work were totally interdependent, that the absence of one
portion would render the other portions virtually useless or
without value, and that the contractor was obligated to construct
and deliver a completed swimming pool consisting of not only
the shell but of all of the finishing work as well. The court's
expression of doubt concerning the dictum in Industrial Home2
dealing with the effect of progress paystead Ass'n v. Junker,1
ments on risk and its explanation of the rejection of a petition
for certiorari in that case must be counted as timely. The language of article 2761 is undesirably indefinite. Perhaps its
application should be restricted to cases where it is manifest the
parties intended to make a positive apportionment of prices and
installments into equivalent pairs and to provide for definitive
acceptance of each portion as completed in discharge of the contractor's obligation with respect to that portion. This would
seldom, if ever, be the case in contracts calling for the construction of some integrated unit like a building or a swimming
58. 247 La. 158, 170 So. 2d 360 (1964).
59. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2111 (1870).
60. 3A CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 695, 697 (1960) ; 4 id. § 949.
61. 3A CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 695 (1960) where fourteen different problems
are listed as possibilities and the statement is made, "The mere statement of these
questions is enough to show that they cannot be answered by the application
of some simple and uniform test of divisibility."

62. Orl. App. no. 7402, Unreported.
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pool.63 Of course, the ultimate question in the instant case was
which party bore the risk of loss. The basic provision of the
Code places it on the undertaker when he furnishes the materials. If this disposition is just, it would seem better to adhere
to it as long as the contractor remains in control of the job
unless there is a clear showing that the contrary was contemplated by the parties.
In the case of McRoberts v. Hayes,6 4 where the plaintiff was
seeking primarily to obtain an interest in certain oil leases, the
court, relying on Hayes v. Muller,65 rejected parol evidence of
an alleged agreement of partnership or joint adventure for the
purpose of securing such leases and engaging in the oil and gas
business. In an effort to avoid the ruling of the Supreme Court
in the earlier case, the plaintiff claimed alternatively a right
to stock in a corporation formed by the defendant joint adventurer, which claim was asserted to be one of ownership in an
incorporeal movable. The view of the court was, however, that,
since the sole asset of the corporation was an interest in mineral
leases acquired by it, the demand for the stock was in substance
a demand for a beneficial interest in the revenues or profits
produced by immovable property. The Supreme Court has
granted certiorari limited to the alternative demand.
In Brooks v. Neyrey,66 plaintiff's suit for the return of double the amount of a deposit made under a construction contract
was rejected on the ground of a failure to put the contractor
in default. A letter written by plaintiff demanding a return of
the deposit plus an additional like amount was said to be not
a putting in default because the letter contained no offer by
plaintiff to perform as required presumably by article 1913 of
the Civil Code. This writer has commented on the uncertainties
surrounding the requirement of a putting in default and will
refrain from doing so further except to repeat that if article
1913 is to be reconciled with other provisions of the Code, its
6 7
application should be restricted to a claim for delay damages.
In Coen v. Toups,'8 plaintiff alleged that when, at his instance, property was being sold by the sheriff by way of fore63. Cf., 5 AUBRY & RAU, D)ROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS, Du LOUAGE no. 374, n. 9
(6th ed. 1941).
64. 173 So. 2d 27 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965).
65. 245 La. 356, 158 So. 2d 191 (1963).
66. 167 So. 2d 400 (La. App. 4tb Cir. 1964).
.67. Cf. LA. CIvIL CODE arts. 1911(2), 2046-2047 (1870).
68. 168 So. 2d 893 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1964).
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closure of a mortgage, defendant caused him to cease bidding
for the property by stating that he intended to pay off the mortgage indebtedness, in consequence of which the property was
adjudicated to defendant for only a fraction of the indebtedness secured by the mortgage. There had been no appraisement.
Plaintiff's claim was rejected. The gist of plaintiff's action
appears to have been that defendant had made a promise for the
purpose of inducing the plaintiff to cease bidding on the property, but since the evidence did not support this claim the holding was undoubtedly appropriate.
The case of Diesel Equip. Corp. v. Epstein,6 9 in which the
Supreme Court held that a dation en paiement of property held
by a consignee for sale was not binding on the consignor, is being
noted in this Review.
LEASE

Previous cases have held that a person who, with the consent of a lessee, places vending machines on the leased premises
under an agreement to divide the profits with the lessee, is not
a sublessee. 70 These cases expressed the view that since the use
and control of no particular space was granted to the owner
of the vending machines, there was no "thing," which is required
for a lease. In the case of Riverside Realty Co. v. Southern Bowling Corp.,7 1 the lessee of a bowling alley subleased space therein
for the operation of a snack bar and lounge and, in connection
therewith, gave the sublessee the privilege of placing vending
machines anywhere on the premises. The owner of the machines opposed their seizure by the lessor for unpaid rent by
the lessee, and the court, finding that the sublessee owed no rent
to the lessee at the time of the seizure, sustained the opposition.
Pretermitting consideration of the validity of the prior cases,
the instant case is clearly distinguishable in that the vending machines were the property of a sublessee on the leased premises.
The Code provides for tacit reconduction where a term
lessee continues to occupy the premises without objection by
the lessor upon the termination of the lease. In Jacobi v.
69. 246 La. 953, 169 So. 2d 61 (1964).
70. Columbia Theatres v. Menuet, 169 So. 809 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1936)
Pelican State Bank v. Webb, 375 So. 855 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1937).
71. 169 So. 2d 228 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964). Writ refused,
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19661

Toomer,7 2 the court held that the parties were free to provide
against reconduction if they saw fit to do so.
Under our Code, the burden is on the lessor to prove that
fire damage to the leased premises was caused by the negligence
of the lessee. The lessor failed to discharge this burden in American Cas. Co. v. Lennox. 73 It was claimed that the lessee's negligence in leaving a burning cigarette in the bedroom of his French
Quarter apartment caused the fire. The proof was insufficient,
however, to sustain the claim, and the court held that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was not applicable.
74
The case of Riverside Realty Co. v. National Food Stores
was concerned with the obligation of a lessee under a lease calling for a fixed rental plus a percentage of gross earnings. After
sustaining very serious losses over a period of months, the
lessee closed the supermarket it was operating on the leased
premises but continued to pay the fixed rental. The court found
that since the supermarket was a "total loss," no harm was done
to the lessor by its closing. It did not rule definitively on the
question of whether an implied obligation to operate continuously
would exist in the absence of an express stipulation. The cases
of Selber Bros., Inc. v. Newstadt's Shoe Stores75 and Rials v.
Davis7 were distinguished.

The privilege of a lessee to withhold rent to cover necessary
repairs was at issue in the case of Leggio v. Manion.77 Claiming
inadequate air conditioning, the lessee paid no rent from the
beginning of occupancy in December 1963 to February 1965,
when his summary eviction was sought, based on the failure
to pay rent. The court held that although the lessee was entitled to oppose the summary eviction proceedings on the ground
that the rent claimed had been properly withheld, he was not
privileged to withhold rent and yet not undertake the necessary
repairs within a reasonable time. Summary eviction was, therefore, ordered. Although the court had no previous authority to
guide it on these issues, the views taken seem realistic and supportable.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

164
169
174
194
212
172

So. 2d 610 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964).
So. 2d 707 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964).
So. 2d 229 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965). Writ denied.
La. 654, 194 So. 579 (1940); id., 203 La. 316, 14 So. 2d 10 (1943).
La. 161, 31 So. 2d 726 (1947).
So. 2d 748 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965).
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Article 4701 of the Code of Civil Procedure was designed
to clarify the problem of notice in support of summary ejectment
proceedings. In Maxwell, Inc. v. Mack Trucks, Inc.,78 the court
held that only a five-day period of notice is required in the case
of a lease having a definite term. This holding appears to be
entirely in accord with the intention of the draftsmen.

TORTS
Wex S. Malone*
The Louisiana appellate courts handed down several hundred
torts cases during the past term. Any attempt to select a manageable group of decisions for discussion can prove to be embarrassing as well as difficult for the reviewer. As I reread the
pages that follow I am struck by the unseemly critical tone of
many of my comments. But the reason for this is fairly obvious. The bulk of the cases, which are clear and sound, escape
discussion for the very reason that they are well decided and
present issues upon which the Louisiana law may be regarded
as fairly well settled. Spectators do not throw pop bottles at
the umpire until he calls a close one.
DUTY
The recently decided case, Lee v. Peerless Ins. Co.,' presents
a picture that is attracting increased attention throughout the
nation. Lee, the deceased, following a few social drinks, drove
at night to Sak's Lounge, defendant's insured, a bar located on
congested Highway 80 in Bossier City. The petition alleged
that the deceased was continuously coaxed to drink by Sak's
waitresses, who were employed for the purpose of encouraging
customers, until he had consumed "thirty-forty drinks," had
grown helpless, and had fallen a number of times to the knowledge of all present. The establishment was closed several hours
after midnight and deceased was required to leave the premises
by employees who were aware of the danger involved in his
exposure to the traffic of the four-lane transcontinental high78. 172 So. 2d 297 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965). Writ refused.
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 175 So. 2d 381 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1965).

